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For H. F. SHERGOLD, Major,
O.C. Army Section,
CSDIC, CMF.

O.S.D.I.C.,
C.I.F.,
1 Aug 45

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2007

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This report contains further information on the operations of Referat IV/III/F PAS ITALIEN in MILAN. It should be read in conjunction with CSDIC/CMF/SD 9.

SECOND DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORT ON
RITHEBISTER GRAF THOM-HOHNSTELN, SONDER-
FUERER (Z) HAUTH AND UFFZ. BURL.

CSDIC/CMF/SD 50
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CSDIC/OMF/SD 50

1. SOURCES

(a) Personal Details

Name	: X THUN-HOHNSTEIN, Graf	Y HAUTH	X BURI
	Ferdinand	Theodor	(Ernst, Wilhelm)
Alias	: @ X DE TONO	@ (Dr) X COM and @	@ (Dr) X PUCCI
	Ferdinando	@ X CRIVELLI,	
		Giovanni	
Rank	: Rittmeister	Sonderführer (Z)	Unteroffizier
Id No	: Stb.I.Ers.Btl.72/184	Unknown	14/W.M.A.
			DONAUESCHINGEN
FP No	: 57332 A.	57332 A.	57332 A.
SS No	: None	None	None
Party No	: None	Unknown	None
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	Panoramastrasse 10.	Oedenburger-	Hotel "Schuetzen",
		strasse 45.	
Unit	: Referat IV/III/F Bds ITALIEN (attached to Sipo und SD		
	Aussenkommando ITALIEN).		
Captured	: 27 Apr 45, MILAN		
Secret No	: M.45/606	M.45/603	M.45/602
Interrogated	: CSDIC, CTF, 13 and 14 Jun 45 and 3 to 9 Jul 45.		

(b) Histories and Careers

See CSDIC/CTF/SD 9.

(c) Assessments

(i) THUN - HOHNSTEIN

Source is willing to cooperate fully, but his memory for details is poor and the value of his information thereby limited.

Reliability : Fair.

(ii) HAUTH

Source gave all information freely. He has an exceedingly clear and accurate memory and provided most of the information contained in this report.

Reliability : Good.

(iii) BURI

Cooperative but less well informed than the above Sources.

Reliability : Fair.

(Interrogated by I.M.)

2. CASES HANDLED

(a) The SACCHI Case

(i) Detection and Arrest

At the beginning of Nov 44 a V-Mann of IV/III/F, in the course of an armoured adventure, made the acquaintance of a certain ex-dancer by the name of Anna FOGOLIN. This woman lived in the Pensione PATRIA at 45, Corso BUENOS

AIRES, MILAN, making her living by larceny and fraud, and by selling her favours. She said she had been the mistress of a man who went by the name of Nino, an interesting type who worked for the Partisans, had plenty of money and false papers, and was in contact with a gang of young men who possessed arms and cars. He was shortly to make a trip to SWITZERLAND, where he was well known to personalities of the Italian Legation and representatives of the Vatican. IV/III/F were greatly interested and their agents were instructed to find this Nino as soon as possible; at first all attempts were unsuccessful, but at the beginning of Dec, FOGOLIN volunteered the information that her life was now in danger from her ex-lover, and she was prepared to betray him to the Germans. In point of fact she was motivated by jealousy, as he had now started an affair with the proprietress of a laundry and intended to marry her. On 10 Dec 44, the Dienststelle was able to arrest Nino, through her cooperation, at the Pensione PATRIA; both those premises and the nearby property of his laundress-fiance were then occupied by V-Loute.

(ii) Interrogation of SACCHI

Preliminary examination of Nino, who was in possession of several sets of forged papers, produced the fact that his real name was Giovanni SACCHI, that he had a long police record, including more than one escape from gaol, to his credit, and that his activities in the political and intelligence field had commenced in early 44. At first very reticent, he gradually broke down under interrogation, and in the end betrayed a large number of all the Allied agents eventually captured by IV/III/F. It always remained a mystery how such an obviously criminal type as SACCHI had managed to gain the confidence of so many agents. The only explanation seemed to be that the espionage missions were insufficiently equipped and reinforced from Allied sources, and were forced to rely on anyone, however doubtful, who could shelter them and supply them with necessary espionage material.

The first espionage group betrayed by SACCHI was the Mission TAR.

(b) Mission TAR

(i) Arrest of DE ANGELIS and GERBI

SACCHI confessed to knowing that two important members of the Allied IS were at the moment living in a house at 26, Piazza Grandi. As a result, two men, one the owner of the property, the (engineer) DE ANGELIS, and the other a young man who at first said he was a liaison officer with the Partisans, but who later turned out to be a WT Operator named GERBI, were arrested there on 25 Dec 44. Through carelessness on the part of the Dienststelle, DE ANGELIS had learned of the arrest of SACCHI, and had dyed his fair hair black, but this merely helped to make him an object of greater suspicion. Papers found on his person, ably evaluated by SACCHI, led to the arrest of four persons, Romolo VALORI, MARZAROLI, a young woman called "Maria" and Carletto VECCHIO. Nothing was proved against them and they were released after a short time. Also found in DE ANGELIS' room was a rough draft of a letter to a man named GAMBIA (see Sub-para d.v.) referring to the setting up of a proposed espionage net and carbon copies of a detailed plan to sabotage roads and railways simultaneously, and thus make a German evacuation of MILAN impossible. This last plan had been communicated to AOT and approved; the necessary material to carry it out had been promised, but was not yet to hand. Implicated in the plot was a certain high railway official named CHITTOLINI, who had already been arrested in TURIN on other charges.

(ii) Interrogation of DE ANGELIS and GERBI

DE ANGELIS' behaviour during interrogation was very correct; he would not reveal anything that would prejudice the safety of any of his associates not already under arrest, and only talked freely about the Mission when he realised that SACCHI's evidence had completely compromised it already. GERBI, too, behaved with equal restraint and courage, expressing himself perfectly willing to undergo the supreme penalty for espionage with his superior,

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if necessary. Their interrogation, based on statements from SACCHI, who was now talking freely, elicited the fact that they were both members of the British Mission "TAR", of which the following picture was built up (for the sake of continuity certain facts obtained by interrogation of persons arrested later are included):

(iii) Despatch of Mission TAR

Mission TAR was sent by the British IS and originally comprised three members, the chief, the Italian Capt BERTO (real name believed to be, but never established, CAMPANA), DE ANGELIS as an assistant and GERBI WT operator. They had been trained at BRINDISI, having received parachute-dropping practice at an airfield outside BRINDISI and a short course on the use of cipher, personal disguise, and shadowing and behaviour during interrogation, at a villa in the town itself. They were provided with 250,000 Lire and two WT sets of British or American manufacture; the money came from SIM, whilst the WT sets were provided by the British.

The party left BRINDISI in mid-June 1944 in a Halifax bomber with a Polish aircrew, and shared their aircraft with Mission ORO (see sub-para c), an unfortunate economy in transport, because it meant that the two missions knew too much about each other, and in addition BERTO and the leader of Mission ORO were on very bad terms. The route lay due NORTH over the ADRIATIC to ISTERIA, and then WEST over the mountains to a position WEST of Lake MAGGIORE. The dropping was unfortunate, because the two missions dropped straight into a German anti-partisan operation, and were very nearly captured, and to make matters worse, TAR had its WT sets damaged, and BERTO broke his leg in two places which put him hors de combat for a month or two. After hiding out in a cave for some days, Mission TAR managed to establish contact with a group of partisans under (Maj) SUPERTI, and went to work.

(iv) Tasks of the Mission

The tasks of Mission TAR were to set up a general espionage network in NORTH ITALY, to study a report on political trends among the partisans, particularly watching Communist tendencies and influence, and to report either by means of WT to their Control in BRINDISI, or by courier via SWITZERLAND to ACT. At least one long report, containing information on the political tendencies of the Partisans, was sent by BERTO through this latter channel, and a large number of WT contacts were made by GERBI with his Control.

(Further details of the working of the WT links are not known, as the technical interrogation of GERBI on the WT side was carried out by Lt ZEMKE of the short-range DF platoon in MILAN (under OKW/WNV/Fu III).

(v) Activities of DE ANGELIS and GERBI

Contrary to their orders from the despatching agency, DE ANGELIS and GERBI, after several weeks in the mountains NW of Lake MAGGIORE, decided to venture further afield. They first went to a factory situated between LEGNANO and BUSTO ARSIZIO, but were unable to establish WT communication from here, and consequently made their way to MILAN, where GERBI installed his set in SACCHI's house at 8, Via Ravenna (2nd floor). SACCHI as a contractor to the partisans and to a lesser extent a partisan leader, had already made the acquaintance of the members of TAR when they first arrived in EOT, and had offered them the use of his house in MILAN. Here, too, was Anna FOGOLIN, at that time SACCHI's mistress. Joining forces with SACCHI proved a mistake, however, as in early Oct the many nefarious activities of SACCHI and FOGOLIN called down a visit from the police, and in the ensuing confusion of a house search, SACCHI was able to get his hands on the WT set, parts of which he then had the effrontery to sell to Mission ORO without the latter group's realising where they had come from. With the loss of the WT set, direct means of communication with ACT were cut off, and GERBI went back to the LEGNANO area, only occasionally visiting his superior, DE ANGELIS, in MILAN.

(vi) Further Activities of DE ANGELIS

While GERBI was living with SACCHI, DE ANGELIS had set up his headquarters in an apartment at No. 24, Piazza Grandi. He still maintained contact by courier with his chief BERTO, who was convalescing with the partisans. BERTO, for his part, was against the splitting up of the group, but could do nothing about it in view of his helpless condition, and continued to send down information on the Partisan situation for DE ANGELIS to forward into AOT by courier. Another of DE ANGELIS' activities at this time was the establishing of a link with the CLNAI, with a view to getting into touch with Gen CADORNI, presumably in order to replenish his coffers and if possible to obtain another WT set. Although he was unsuccessful in contacting the General, he did contact another Allied IS group, that of DE LAURENTIS (see sub-para f). He also worked up a small espionage ring with the cooperation of a certain Dr SAGESSE, whom he had known for some years, and whose surgery at 24, Via Francesco Sforza, he used as a report centre. By Nov his financial position had become rather serious, and the fact coupled with a determination to obtain another WT set by some means or other led him to arrange a journey to SWITZERLAND. He made the trip in the company of SACCHI, whose relations to the group had already been frowned on by BERTO. The two were guided by GELBA (see sub-para d.v) over the frontier and brought to BERNE, where contact was made with Gen BIANCHI, Military Attache at the Italian Legation (not to be confused with Col BIANCHI of Mission ORO), and the British IS in the person of "Maj JONES". Although DE ANGELIS was reproached with his arbitrary decision to remain in MILAN against orders, he was promised a WT set and also a new task, which was at that stage not specified. By coincidence, he also met the head of Mission ORO there. Not long after his return to MILAN in early Dec, and while waiting for instructions about his new task, he was arrested by IV/III/F, with GERBI, as described in sub-para a i above.

(vii) Activities and Arrest of BERTO

Meanwhile, at about the same time that the arrest of DE ANGELIS and GERBI took place, BERTO, having recovered from his broken leg, came down to MILAN, and contacted SAGESSE, of whose connection with the Mission he already knew. Learning what had taken place, he returned to the mountains, where he had already done excellent work, and had in fact so entered into the light of the Partisans that his fellow agents reproached him for having communistic tendencies. After a month he re-appeared in MILAN, i.e. about mid Jan 45, and found that changes had taken place since his last visit. SAGESSE, now in hiding from the Sipo, as an anti-fascist, had recruited his new landlord, a friend of his named BELLAVISTA, who lived in the neighbourhood of Corso Roma and who was at the same time a V-Mann of IV/III/F, into a new espionage net, which included a priest (DON ETTORE, who lived at 45, Via Francesco Sforza, an Italian officer MARINELLI, (Dr Raffaele BOVIENZE from BUSTO ARSIZIO, a woman called Conna MARINI, an official from the Prefecture of VARESE and a rich manufacturer from near MILAN (names unknown). (This group was kept under observation, until the TAR case was considered closed. It was then decided that they were all, with the exception of BOVIENZE, harmless enough and not worth the trouble of arresting. BOVIENZE however, who had also been connected with another espionage group (see Mission ORO sub-para c iii), was arrested, and released on 22 Apr 45.) BERTO took up his abode in the house used by BELLAVISTA and SAGESSE and directed this resurrected Mission TAR, helped by funds provided by the members themselves. He then set about overcoming the personal difficulties which existed between himself and Mission ORO, by personal contact, but unfortunately these attempts failed. He was at the same time working on a plan for the despatch of information to the Allies, concerning the bombing of the war potential of MILAN, without utterly destroying the city's industries; all these factors, i.e. his new plans for the future and his present complicated financial and material situation, prompted him to write a long report containing a request for help which he sent by courier to SWITZERLAND for eventual despatch to his employers in AOT. The report was handed to IV/III/F by BELLAVISTA and sent on in the hope that the answer to it would likewise fall into German hands, a hope which was not fulfilled.

Soon afterwards, however, BERTO became involved with another Mission (0 11 see sub-para e) and his arrest together with SAGESSE, who had for some time been under observation, could no longer be delayed. It took place on 1 Feb 45, and the two were lodged temporarily in a house at 15, Via Mozart.

(viii) Interrogation of BERTO

Little was learned that was not already known from SACCHI and from the observations of V-Leute, but certain gaps were at least filled in and a complete picture formed of the history of Mission T.R. as already described. The behaviour of BERTO and SAGESSE under interrogation reflected to their credit; they admitted their own activities, but did not involve other persons or betray any Allied Intelligence organisation generally. It may be mentioned that, during interrogation, BERTO was offered the chance of collaboration with the Germans in a plan to work with anglophile Italians to combat Russian and communist influence in NORTH ITALY. He was not against the project but made the reservation that British consent was indispensable. In any case the idea went no further as the course of the war precluded any further steps being taken in the matter.

(ix) Disposal of Members of Mission T.R. and Helpers

BERTO, DE ANGELIS and GERBI were transferred to BOLZANO Concentration Camp after their interrogation in mid Feb 45 and released in mid Apr. SAGESSE suffered a severe haemorrhage soon after his arrest and was admitted to the hospital of the SAN VITTORE prison where he was found to be in an advanced state of tuberculosis. Even here he continued to work on behalf of the Allies, and was suspected of getting information out of the prison in collusion with one of the doctors. Negotiations were attempted unsuccessfully for his exchange and he was released unconditionally on 20 April 45. SACCHI was at first lodged in the military section of the SAN VITTORE prison after his interrogation was completed, and then in Feb was transferred to Abt VI of the prison. When the Germans evacuated MILAN he was handed over to the Italian Police authorities. FOGOLIN, hitherto at liberty, was arrested at the end of Feb as it was felt that she knew more about this espionage ring than she had at first admitted, and she was finally handed over to the Italians together with SACCHI.

(o) Mission ORO

(i) Preliminary Information

On 4 Nov 44 members of the Sipo und SD Aussenkommando MAILAND, acting on their own information, seized a WT set with its operator in a house at 2, Via Mozart, MILAN. As a result of the interrogation by them of the operator, a certain Gino D'ANGELO, the AK passed on valuable information to IV/III/F, including the fact that two persons, known as "PACE" and ARGANTE were suspected of being connected with the Allied IS. The arrest on 10 Dec 44 of SACCHI (see 2 a i) and his subsequent interrogation by IV/III/F added to this information to the extent of identifying D'ANGELO as the WT operator of a group known as Mission ORO, of which "PACE" was the chief. (cf CSDIC/CME/SD 15 para 2 c III a iv).

(ii) Arrest of "PACE" (PALUMBO) and Collaborators

SACCHI undertook to find "PACE" if IV/III/F would release him for the purpose, but his offer was rejected since IV/III/F was convinced that "PACE" moved around too much to be caught by SACCHI. The V-Mann BELLAVISTA (mentioned in connection with Mission T.R. above) then brought in the information that BERTO, head of Mission T.R., was trying to arrange a meeting with "PACE" (hereafter referred to by his real name PALUMBO). BELLAVISTA learned that BERTO had arranged the meeting for 18 Jan 45 at 1030 a.m. in the Largo Cairoli. IV/III/F arranged for a number of V-Leute to be present ready to seize PALUMBO. Although BERTO and PALUMBO both arrived at the right time, for some unaccountable reason, failed to recognise each other and passed

by without stopping, so that the intended trap failed. A second rendezvous arranged for 22 Jan 45 was also reported by BELLAVISTA, but at the crucial moment a sharp air raid drove everyone off the streets and the quarry again escaped.

Two other trails were followed, however, which eventually resulted in the capture of PALUMBO and most of his collaborators. The first of these led from the restaurant "FIRENZE", which was known to be a favourite haunt of doubtful persons, to a house at 50, Viale Tunisia, in which lived a group of young men with no apparent occupation. This house was kept continually under observation, although the activity and connections of these men could not be established. The second lead was obtained from observation of a man who had accompanied BERTO on the occasion of the latter's first arranged rendezvous with PALUMBO. When BERTO was arrested (see 2 b vii) this man was also arrested and found to be an Italian air force captain named ZACCHIA. Recognised by the interrogator (HAUTH) to be a weak type, he was offered his freedom if he would betray his chief. This ZACCHIA agreed to do and revealed that his chief was a certain Col. BLANCHI who was known to IV/III/F as a collaborator of PALUMBO from statements made by SACCHI. Following a proposal of IV/III/F, ZACCHIA arranged a rendezvous with BLANCHI at which the latter was arrested by V-Leute. BLANCHI was accompanied by a young man recognised as one of the group living at 50 Viale Tunisia. The latter was also arrested and the house in Viale Tunisia was raided. Three people were arrested and a large number of intelligence reports ready for despatch to SWITZERLAND were found. The house was occupied by V-Leute and in the next few days about ten people were arrested while visiting it. Among these was the long sought for PALUMBO, a Col who was Chief of Staff to General CADORNI. PALUMBO was accompanied by the son-in-law of Gen CADORNI, Carlo GREPPI. The young man arrested with BLANCHI turned out to be a certain Fio BRUNI, PALUMBO's adjutant. PALUMBO, BRUNI and GREPPI behaved with commendable courage under interrogation, while BLANCHI contracted typhus and was not interrogated for several months. The following picture of Mission ORO was, however, able to be built up partly from statements already made by SACCHI and members of Mission TAR and from collation of information obtained from the large number of persons now interrogated.

(iii) Despatch of ORO

PALUMBO, alias PIERRI or PACE or PERRONE, was an officer of the Italian General Staff, who had fought for FRUNCO in SPAIN and against the Russians during the present war, and suffered great mental conflict at the time of the Italian armistice in Sep 43. Eventually, however, he decided to remain loyal to the King. In late spring 44 he had been summoned by the Italian Intelligence Service to BRINDISI and chosen for espionage work in NORTH ITALY. He was given a short training in parachute dropping and then put at the head of the British Mission. He had a number of difficulties in getting together the members of his Mission, e.g. his original assistant BERTO left him to lead Mission TAR and he refused to accept his original WT operator GERBI, who also went to Mission TAR. Instead of BERTO he was given a less valuable replacement in the person of an Italian Army Lt, ARGANTE, but on the other hand received a first class WT operator, Gino D'ANGELO. As already mentioned in the account of Mission TAR, the two missions left BRINDISI together in Jun 44 by air. They were dropped in an area NW of Lake MAGGIORE, Mission ORO losing all its baggage and WT sets in the process, so that they had to take over one set from Mission TAR. It was at this period that PALUMBO also made the acquaintance of SACCHI, who helped both missions TAR and ORO to obtain supplies for a time while they were with the partisans, and with Dr. BOWLENZE mentioned in connection with Mission TAR (see sub-para b vii).

(iv) Mission ORO established in MILAN

PALUMBO's task was to establish contact with CLN.I, study the political tendencies within this body and if possible gradually assume control of it, and in addition set up his network for the collection of military information. After a delay of about a month, caused by difficulty in acquiring the necessary identity documents, the party, consisting of

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PALUMBO, ARGANTE and D'ANGELO, moved into MILAN. D'ANGELO set up his WT set in the house of SACCHI, where the WT set of Mission TAR was also later established, and ARGANTE lived with the above mentioned ZACCHIA at 72, Via Corsica. PALUMBO was constantly changing his address. He soon saw the inadvisability of having too close connection with such a doubtful character as SACCHI, and after a week or so ordered the WT set to be moved to the partially bombed house of a friend of his, Marchese CRIVELLI, at 8, Via Pontaccio, and from there, in view of the fact that CRIVELLI was a known anti-fascist, it was moved after three weeks to 2, Via Mozart, where it was eventually seized together with the operator D'ANGELO by the NK MILAN on 4 Nov 44. Although on the whole the WT link with control worked satisfactorily, the set was not technically perfect and the repair and provisional spares proved difficult and dangerous. SACCHI provided spares on occasions, once by stealing and cannibalising the WT set of Mission TAR. ARGANTE was ill most of the time and showed little enthusiasm for his work, and after the seizure of the set went to TURIN and ceased all activity for the Allied IS. He finally contracted tuberculosis and made his way to SWITZERLAND. PALUMBO himself in the period from Jul to Nov 44 in which his mission was operating in MILAN was not particularly energetic and the results obtained by Mission ORO were poor.

(v) PALUMBO's political work

After the loss of the set and operator and the defection of ARGANTE, PALUMBO decided to devote himself to that aspect of his task which was in connection with the partisans. The general partisan position in N. ITALY was far from satisfactory to the Allied High Command; there were a number of political parties represented, and they did not have the spirit of cooperation necessary for the putting forth of a maximum effort. It was the Allied aim to unify these partisan forces under one command and provide them with a stiffening of regular officers with no political bias. To this end Gen CADORNA had arrived from AOT in Aug 44 (see case of De LAURENTIS sub para f) and he and PALUMBO had already been in contact and exchanged views. In mid Nov 44 PALUMBO decided to make his way to SWITZERLAND with two aims in mind. Firstly and principally he set himself the task of recruiting suitable Italian officers from Swiss Internment Camps to introduce into the partisan formations, and secondly to offset the influence of a previous mission led by Prof PARRI on behalf of the CLNAI to AOT, a mission which he and Gen CADORNA felt was aimed at undermining the latter's power in N. ITALY. It was never known what transpired concerning this second, highly confidential part of his errand, but as far as the recruiting mission was concerned, about ten officers, all politically dependable, were selected and actually turned up in MILAN between Dec 44 and Feb 45. Among them were the persons already mentioned in sub-para ii above. Carlo GREPPI, the son-in-law of Gen CADORNA and a member of the Third SAVOLA Cavalry Regt, worked as the treasurer of the Partisan High Command and revealed that PALUMBO had received, all told, the sum of a million Lire from the CLNAI; when it is realised that on the occasion of Prof PARRI's mission on behalf of the CLNAI to AOT in Nov, 16,000,000 Lire were placed at their disposal by the Allies, this contribution seems rather niggardly. Pio BRUNI was the personal adjutant of PALUMBO and responsible for very important work, including the writing and editing of reports, personal liaison on behalf of his chief, confidential courier missions, and last but not least, the archives of the High Command, a work which was still in its early stages.

"BLANCHI", whose real name proved to be Aldo BEOLCHINI, with another alias, Raggionere "MONTI", was a General Staff officer and old friend of PALUMBO. Although, in consequence of his illness, he was never properly interrogated, it seemed that he worked under PALUMBO to organise the espionage side of the Partisan High Command, a task to which he devoted himself with great industry. His link with the latter was ZACCHIA, who as mentioned in sub-para ii above eventually betrayed him. PALUMBO kept some of these newly recruited officers with him in MILAN and sent others to the VAL d'OSSOLA area, which was militarily and politically in a very confused state, or for special work in VERONA. PALUMBO declared that he intended these officers to enter partisan units as ordinary members and gradually work their

way to the top by their own moral and technical superiority, with the special aim of ousting the political commissars from military command. PALUMBO even hoped to replace in this way the most well known partisan leader in N. ITALY, MOSCATELLI, by one of his own officers, a certain Col whose alias was Delle TORRI. Similarly he had the idea of replacing the military commandant in MILAN, a certain COMASCHI, by another friend of his Gen MAGLIANO, an attempt which failed. In giving this account of his political activities, PALUMBO so far succeeded in convincing IV/III/F that his activity was not altogether against German interests, in as much as it had the combatting of communist influence for its aim, that the attempt to capture Gen CADORNA was gradually given up, since the latter, after PALUMBO's arrest, remained the strongest protagonist of moderate views.

(vi) PALUMBO's further Espionage Activity

PALUMBO's activities in the espionage field had by no means stopped with the loss of Mission ORO's set and operator and the defection of ARGANTE, since naturally the setting up of an Intelligence Service was an integral part of his attempt to form a single military high command. He still hoped to be able to re-establish an espionage network and to restore communication with his base in BRINDISI. He endeavoured to set up new information networks, and as much as possible to utilize in addition those already existing among the partisan units. He had a high opinion of the Intelligence organisation of the Partisan High Command PIEDMONT but regarded the similar organisations in other regions as very poor. He hoped to be able to link up these various organisations headed by Col BEOLCHINI ("BLANCHI"). He also cooperated largely with the SIM organisation in LOMBARDY, which provided him with very good information on the activity of AK MILAN, which it could only have gained from someone in the higher ranks of the latter. In the matter of communications with his base, he had of course two alternatives, either by WT or by courier. Although he stated in interrogation that the loss of his WT set in Nov had ruled out the former method almost completely, IV/III/F found this hard to believe as there were plenty of sets at the disposal of the partisans in LOMBARDY, and in any case a number of WT messages signed by him and ready for despatch were discovered among his documents. A certain Prof Claudio SILANI, arrested on 10 Feb 45, was suspected, although not proved, to be the link between PALUMBO and his WT set. SILANI was later released unconditionally due to lack of evidence.

During PALUMBO's visit to SWITZERLAND (see sub-para v above) he had arranged a system whereby at least every ten days a courier, usually one of his own officers, went to SWITZERLAND. As personal and confidential courier he had Pio BRUNI, who travelled under the name of "RICCI", and was used for very confidential errands. Between 19 and 23 Jan 45 BRUNI went to SWITZERLAND and had interviews with all the important members of the Allied IS, and was to have made another trip on 12 Feb for the purpose of bringing back two WT sets and operators to MILAN. The crossing of the frontier was usually made at a small village about 7 miles N. of COMO, where there were two smugglers, one a fisherman and the other a labourer, who carried the intelligence reports together with their own smuggled goods over the frontier and, when necessary, also guided the couriers across the border.

(vii) Allied Intelligence Service Representatives in SWITZERLAND

The dispatches were separated into intelligence material for onward transmission to LUGANO, and specially important or administrative communications, which went straight to BERNE. A certain "JOE" (real name believed to be BUSTELLI) did the sorting of the dispatches for both places between the American and the British IS, working under a man called FEDERICI; these two both served as Intelligence advisers to the Italian Committee at LUGANO and as liaison officers between LUGANO and the Italian Legation at BERNE. The LUGANO dispatches for the British IS went to a certain GASPERINI, and for the American IS to "JONES"; the BERNE ones for the British went to Prof ROSSI, and for the Americans to "ARTURO". A Lt PULT (see CAFFERATI Case, sub-para g below) was in control of the whole courier system in this area, and kept a timetable of the various journeys. PALUMBO stated that after

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Jan he began to send far more material to the American IS, whereas before he had dealt almost exclusively with the British. Documents seized by IV/III/F showed that an increasing interest was being taken by all these agencies in information in the chemical and industrial sphere, especially in the production and exploitation of "acqua pesante", also in the Japanese counter-intelligence service which had been operating in N. ITALY.

(viii) Disposal of PALUMBO and Confederates, and German views on the exchange of Captured Agents.

PALUMBO remained in custody until 24 Apr 45, when IV/III/F was approached by the banker CELLA, the man who had taken part in the negotiations between MUSSOLINI and CADORNA in MILAN. He brought a special plea for the release of the prisoner, and in view of the stage that the war had reached at the time, PALUMBO was released unconditionally. At the same time his assistants, including those already mentioned and others of less importance, were also set free. Sources' explanation for the rather surprising ease with which the Germans released or exchanged dangerous Allied IS personnel during the last stages of the war, is as follows: Owing to the precarious status in which the Germans found themselves, it was impossible to hold prisoners so securely that they could guarantee their safe custody, and they seem to have been nervous of exercising their right to execute them as spies, especially in view of the fact that prisoners were invariably Italians and they wished to avoid causes for retaliatory Italian excesses when they eventually had to evacuate. Knowing that the campaign in ITALY could not last much longer, they realised that known agents would hardly have time to return to MOF and constitute any further serious danger to them. Moreover, the number of relatively important German officers and agents captured by the Partisans gave the latter a considerable bargaining factor. Consequently, as soon as interrogation was finished, many prisoners were either exchanged for their opposite numbers in Partisan or British hands, released under supervision, or at most sent to the camp at BOLZANO.

(ix) Conclusion

IV/III/F came to the conclusion that the arrest of PALUMBO and his assistants had broken up the active part of the partisan High Command, a success which would have meant a great deal to the Germans had the war situation developed normally. In fact, however, the arrest of these moderately inclined officers gave a free hand to the extremists in the partisan movement, in the confused situation just before and after the German capitulation, a result which the German authorities had by no means desired.

(d) The GAMBA case

(i) Detection and arrest

After the arrest of SACCHI on 10 Dec 44, IV/III/F kept the house in which he had been captured (Pensione PATRIA, 45, Corso Buenos Aires) under observation. On 11 or 12 Dec 44 a man giving the name of "NERI" came to see SACCHI. He was closely questioned as to the reason for his visit, and his answers regarded as unsatisfactory and contradictory; they in no way agreed with the facts obtained from the interrogation of SACCHI. The man was arrested and lodged in the military section of the SAN VITTORE Prison. By a mistake on the part of the admin authorities he was transferred to the SD section of the prison, but was later returned to his original place of detention, where he remained until the end of his interrogation, about 25 Feb 45.

(ii) Forged documents

While on his way to prison "NERI" or, to give him his real name, GAMBA, to which he eventually admitted, attempted to destroy certain documents. As far as they could be pieced together these were an identity card purporting to have been issued by the Sipo und SD Aussonstelle in EDOLO, a letter of introduction to a person living in the Corso XXII Marzo, and GAMBA's personal

documents, all made out in the name of "NERI". The latter were immediately regarded with the greatest suspicion since they showed his home town to have been PADUA, a place from which IV/III/F had already a large collection of forged papers. It subsequently transpired that they had been prepared in the offices of Gen BLANCHI, Military Attache to the Italian Legation in BERNE.

(iii) Interrogation of GAMBIA

Prior to his release GAMBIA revealed no information of any value. It was found however that he was known to AK MILAN, who were provided with the names of all the persons arrested by IV/III/F (and vice-versa). AK MILAN accordingly sent Oberscharfuhrer WOERNLE and Dr "UGO" to interrogate him for their own purposes. From them it was learned that GAMBIA had been arrested by AK MILAN some months previously, at about the beginning of Apr 44, whilst on an espionage mission from SWITZERLAND; his baggage had been searched and important and incriminating documents found. In May 44 however he had escaped, and although injured in the process, had managed to make his way to SWITZERLAND. Further information about GAMBIA was supplied by SACCHI.

(iv) Attempted 'turn-round'.

SACCHI revealed that GAMBIA was in contact with two smugglers known as ARTURO and PETRO who passed agents and messages over the Swiss border. On being questioned, GAMBIA admitted his relations with the two smugglers, and apparently agreed with the suggestion that he should brief a V-mann to enable the latter to contact and trap ARTURO and PETRO. He wrote a letter of introduction for the V-mann, who contacted the two smugglers on about 20 Dec 44. GAMBIA however had so phrased the letter that the latter were immediately aware that they were dealing with a German agent, and refused to be drawn into a trap.

GAMBIA also admitted to having delivered messages to Cardinal SCHUSTER in MILAN and to the Bishops of BERGAMO and BRESCIA, and stated that he had not had time to collect the replies before being arrested. Although he avowed that the messages only dealt with charity and relief matters between the above mentioned clerics and Papal representatives in SWITZERLAND, this was regarded as highly improbable. Despite the failure of the attempt to trap the two smugglers, GAMBIA was asked to furnish a letter of introduction by means of which a V-mann could try to obtain the answers which GAMBIA had not been able to collect. GAMBIA willingly wrote the letter but failed to supply the necessary security check by which the Bishops could recognize a genuine messenger, so that this second attempt also failed.

(v) Release and Final Statement

After much hesitation GAMBIA revealed the address of his family in BRESCIA. His father was notified and allowed to visit the prisoner twice. Meanwhile the investigation was closed, and after an endeavour to have GAMBIA exchanged for a German agent in Allied hands, he was finally released unconditionally on 25 Apr 45, as the course of the war had made his further retention in MILAN pointless.

After his release GAMBIA suddenly decided to make a full statement of his espionage activities and told the following story.

He had been recruited for espionage work by the British Intelligence Service at the beginning of 44. Between Jan and Mar 44 he had made three journeys from SWITZERLAND to NORTH ITALY, most of his activity having centered in MILAN. His task was the collection of information on the German Army and liaison with an Italian espionage group known as VAL. It was on the last of these journeys that he was captured by the AK MILAN. After his escape from prison he had spent some months working as an Allied propaganda officer in an internment camp for Italian officers in SWITZERLAND. In Aug 44 he began working as a guide to important agents and couriers, helping them to cross the Swiss frontier from the Italian town of TIRANO. Among the persons he escorted across the frontier were SACCHI and DE ANGELIS, of Mission TAR (sub-para b above). At the beginning of Dec 44 he was given a mission by a

British agency in SWITZERLAND to set up an espionage ring covering MILAN, BRESCIA and BERGAMO. It was probably intended that his collaborators in the mission were to have been DE ANGELIS and SACCHI. He left SWITZERLAND for MILAN, arriving there on 8 Dec 44. He immediately contacted SACCHI, and then delivered his messages to Cardinal SCHUSTER, and to the Bishops of BERGAMO and BRESCIA, a job which took him two days, and the purpose of which he never revealed. After making this interesting statement, GAMBAL disappeared, presumably to his home in BRESCIA.

(e) American Missions 011, 021, U16 and RAINCH-SEGRE Group

(i) Detection and Arrest of Members of the above Missions

Towards the end of Jan 45, the V-man of IV/III/F, BELLAVISTA, who had succeeded in penetrating Mission TAR, met a highly placed priest named Don ETTORE (see sub para b vii) in order to obtain money to hand over to Mission TAR. In the priest's rooms he met a young man called Luigi ROTTA, who was stated by Don ETTORE to be working for the Americans. When BELLAVISTA and ROTTA again met, the following day, the former enquired whether it would be possible to get some dispatches sent through by means of ROTTA's WT link or alternatively through his courier into SWITZERLAND. The latter replied that he had at the moment no WT set in MILAN, but that he was sending a courier into SWITZERLAND within the next few days. A meeting was consequently arranged for the next day, and IV/III/F were duly informed; ROTTA was arrested after the meeting as he was entering a house at 15, Via Mozart, together with the proprietor of the house, who was suspected of being the courier. The proprietor, Gustavo ARGENTI, was not the courier, but, terrified by his arrest, he agreed to arrange the arrest of the courier, Altono ROSSI, which was done without delay. Those already arrested were interrogated, and admitted to being members of an American IS organisation, and betrayed a report centre at 28, Via Vincenzo Monti. This house was at once raided and two more people, Giuseppe MARZORATTI and Ernesto SILVIERI, were arrested with a rich store of documents. The house was kept under observation by V-men and in the next few days, between 31 Jan and 2 Feb 45, Agricola SEARS, Arrigo BORIN, Mario BARBATO, one other name unknown, and finally Maj USMIANI were arrested. Meanwhile SILVIERI proved only too willing to betray his other accomplices, and in the next few days was instrumental in the arrest of Roberto ITLLI, and Dr. PEDUZZI, along with a number of persons active in VERONA and UDINE who were arrested through IV/III/F VERONA. In addition he expressed himself ready to bring about the arrest of Gen CADORNA, whose movements were known to him, and an important member of the Allied IS who was about to enter SWITZERLAND. In neither instance was he successful.

(ii) Confusion in the Arco del Pace

In connection with the attempt to arrest Gen CADORNA a comedy of errors ensued which showed the essential lack of liaison between IV/III/F and Sipo und SD Gruppe OBERITALIEN WEST and the AK MILAN. SILVIERI declared that CADORNA could be found at the Arco del Pace every Friday at midday. A trap was arranged for Friday 9 Feb 45. SILVIERI and a V-mann of IV/III/F were at the Arco del Pace at the appointed time. An unknown person arrived and gave the correct password. SILVIERI, who apparently did not know CADORNA by sight, assumed this person to be he, and arranged another meeting at the same place for the following day. The man was followed after he left the Arco del Pace and strangely enough was seen to make his way to the Sipo und SD HQ in the Albergo Regina, where he disappeared. On the next day the meeting between SILVIERI and this individual took place, and the latter was easily arrested by waiting V-loute of IV/III/F. SILVIERI and the V-mann accompanying him were, however, in turn arrested by a group of Italians and taken away to the Albergo Regina. After some heated telephone conversations between the Albergo Regina and IV/III/F the prisoners were mutually released. Although the matter was never fully cleared up, it seemed that AK MILAN had got onto the trail of CADORNA at the same time as IV/III/F, and due to faulty collaboration between the two departments had mistaken each other's agents for the wanted man.

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(iii) SILVIERI escapos

All the prisoners were kept in custody for a time in the apartment at 15, Via Mozart, now occupied by V-Leute of IV/III/F, before being transferred to the San Vittore gaol. SILVIERI however remained at Via Mozart until 12 Feb 45, and thus gained the impression that IV/III/F intended to employ him, rather than to send him to gaol. To clinch matters therefore, he expressly offered his services as an agent and informer. He was greatly disappointed therefore when he was transferred to gaol after all on the 12 Feb. (This was done because IV/III/F gave up the apartment in the Via Mozart and had to lodge SILVIERI somewhere while waiting for official approval for SILVIERI's appointment from IV/III/F VERONA). He decided to attempt an escape, which he did in a most adventurous manner over the roof of the prison, helped by the slackness of the V-Leute set to guard him. All subsequent attempts at recapture in MILAN and surrounding districts remained without success.

(iv) Results of Interrogation

The interrogation of all those arrested and examination of the many documents captured showed that four IS groups were involved, although it proved impossible to obtain a complete picture of all of them. They were Missions 011, 021, U16, and the group of Gianni RAINACH-SEGRE, all working under the American IS, and directed from LUGANO by a person named SCOTTI, apparently known also as "JONES". Although there was plenty of evidence of the use of WT sets, more particularly by the RAINACH-SEGRE group, no transmitters were found.

(v) Mission 011

Mission 011 came into being in the following way: Carlo PELLEGRINI, alias "ORTELO 333", an interpreter of the American Consulate in LUGANO, and for a long time a member of the American Intelligence Service, came to MILAN in Nov 44 to form an espionage network. He recruited an old friend, ARGENTI, and then MARZORATTI, ROTTI and SILVIERI. The latter had been working well for the American Intelligence Service for a long time, principally under RAINACH-SEGRE, with whom however he was at that time on very bad terms. By Jan 45 the group was sending excellent reports by courier to SWITZERLAND; the reports for Feb were captured in ARGENTI's house. The latter was responsible for editing the reports and for the payment of informers, assisted by ROTTI who acted as his secretary. MARZORATTI was responsible for the LOMBARDY area, with particular emphasis on industrial espionage and the formation of an organisation to prevent destruction of industry in the event of a German evacuation. He also provided the forged documents for 011 and its sister organisations, and reported on German propaganda. SILVIERI built up a subsidiary network in the VENETO area, a district which he knew well and only happened to be in MILAN at the time of his arrest for the purpose of getting money and delivering his reports. There was some suspicion that ROSSI may have been a double agent, and although he never actually claimed this during his interrogation, he did suggest that he would be prepared to transfer his services to the German IS; the sudden end of hostilities however made it impossible to make use of his offer. The other arrested members of Mission 011, namely BARBATO, SEARS, ITALI and BORIN, were regarded as minor agents who constituted no grave danger.

(iv) Other Missions

Very little was found out about Mission 021, except that such a group existed, and used the services of ROSSI as their courier. Nothing was discovered about its members, area of operations or its specific tasks.

Mission U16 was of interest both to IV/III/F and F.A.T 370, which had already picked up the trail of Maj USMLANI, some time before the former department. After a long and largely fruitless chase on the part of F.A.T 370, IV/III/F, following information gained from members of Mission 020, were able to capture him. F.A.T 370 on the other hand later captured a number of his assistants, and the Mission was thus broken up. A number of documents were found on USMLANI, showing that he had obtained important information on the German U-boat situation.

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Little was discovered either about the RAINCH-SEGRE group. During observation of the house of its chief at 34, Via Ariosta, IV/III/F found that the house was also being watched by some other German CE department, probably AK MILAN, but they were never officially informed of this. They were just on a very promising scent which was to lead to the arrest of RAINCH-SEGRE, when the course of the war interrupted their activities. RAINCH-SEGRE was an Allied agent well known to many German CE departments, including those operating in Southern GERMANY.

(vii) Dr. PEDUZZI

One of the persons arrested, Dr. PEDUZZI, seemed to belong to none of the above mentioned missions and it was never established for what organisation he was actually working. He worked under the alias "PELTRE" and declared that at the time of his arrest he had only just begun to make contact with Mission Oll. Later, after his release, he stated that he had been the head of another espionage network which had obtained valuable information on the PO defences. He had also collaborated intimately with the American agent Dr. LEENER (see sub-para h below).

(viii) Disposal of the Prisoners

Of the persons arrested, ARGENTI and MARZORATI were exchanged on 20 Apr 45, ITALI and BORIN were released under the Easter amnesty, and the others released unconditionally on 25 Apr 45. The members of those missions, with the exception of USMLANI and Dr. PEDUZZI, made a very bad impression on their interrogators, and their conduct stood out in contrast to most of the members of other missions, who were for the most part officers. The part played by SILVIERI, and an attempt by ARGENTI to buy his freedom for two million Lire, is characteristic of the general moral fibre shown while under arrest.

(f) DE LAURENTIS CASE (Mission FARWAY)

(i) Preliminary Investigation and Arrest of DE LAURENTIS

An agent of IV/III/F came to hear in the course of gossip in Oct 44 that three young men had moved into a house at 52, Viale Argonne and were leading a life that was to say the least of it suspicious. Apparently they were in a position to pay a rent of 24,000 Lire a month, there were strange boxes of rations in the house, and a steady coming and going of different people, some of whom spent the night there. Enquiries with the porter revealed that their names were Achille "PINCHIERA", Lionello "SPADA" and Alessandro RAVA. When the opportunity presented itself, V-Leute got themselves into the house and found, among other suspicious things, parts for WT sets, a timetable for rendezvous at fixed times and places, and instructions and rules on notice boards which were drawn up in a distinctly military manner. The house was therefore ordered to be watched, and people who resorted there to be shadowed. It was noticed that they nearly all wore sun-glasses, which for the time of the year was rather remarkable. The trail led from this house to the restaurant "FIRENZE" (mentioned in the case of Mission ORO), where these people regularly met for lunch and were constantly discussing matters in a most conspiratorial manner. Meanwhile, one of the V-Leute had been rather clumsy in his shadowing, and immediately the house in the Viale Argonne became deserted, so that the Restaurant "FIRENZE" became the only contact. From here, V-Leute were led to a house at 2, Via Bandello, and to another at 20, Corso Porta Nuova, the latter house being the residence of a woman called Wally GASSER, who had come under suspicion some months before in connection with an illicit transmitter. This was the resort of three very interesting types, one too tall to be anything but an exceptional Italian, another with a bushy fair moustache, who looked equally exotic, and a third who was described as extraordinarily quick-moving and alert. The latter proved later to be a certain SOGNO-RATA, head of the FRANCOCHI group, an Italian espionage and sabotage organisation, which was never broken up (See CSDIC/CMF/SD 49, para 2.16). About the end of Nov,

IV/III/F was prepared to step in and take action, but two days before the planned arrest, they received information from a V-mann that all traces of the suspects had been removed from the house. As a result attention was shifted to the house in the Via Bandello, where it was observed that "PINCHIERA" came almost every day, and towards the middle of Dec he was joined in his visits by "SPADA". On 15 Dec 44, the latter disappeared, shortly afterwards followed by "PINCHIERA", and it gradually appeared that the scent had been lost. Then in the middle of Jan 45 a person known to be a member of the suspicious circle was seen in the neighbourhood of the house carrying a heavy suitcase (later known to have contained a WT set), and interest was again aroused. At the end of Jan "PINCHIERA", whose real name was found to be De LAURENTIS, again showed up at the house in the Via Bandello and on 8 Feb 45 was arrested along with two others who were subsequently released for lack of evidence of espionage activity. A fourth person, known to be Carlo, succeeded in escaping. In spite of further careful observation of the house no more important arrests were made as a result.

(ii) Documents incriminating De LAURENTIS

When arrested De LAURENTIS had in his possession, besides a number of forged identity documents, a very incriminating letter containing the following message:- "To Carlo; A certain task is to be carried out by "one of the young men" (Pio) with the help of SOMMA; Guido has been informed. Signed VAL". IV/III/F know that SOMMA referred to the deputy of Prof PARRI, head of the Partito d'Azione; VAL to General CADORNA; Guido to his Chief of Staff Col PALUMBO (see Mission ORO, sub-para c above) and found out that Pio referred to the latter's adjutant BRUNI (also see c above). It was thus clear that an important organisation had been uncovered and in the light of other documents which were discovered at the same time, a great deal of evidence was accumulated against De LAURENTIS.

(iii) Interrogation of De LAURENTIS

De LAURENTIS behaved very well under interrogation, but the information already in the hands of IV/III/F was too complete for him to be able to refuse to make any statement at all. The following is the story of his mission as revealed by interrogation and evaluation of the documents:-

De LAURENTIS had two aliases apart from "PINCHIERA", namely "FEREO" and "MAZZEI". He was a native of ROME. Through his connections with representatives of the Partito d'Azione there, he received an offer to be sent to EOT for the purpose of studying political trends (especially the CLNLI), under Allied auspices. He was to report back to EOT by WT. He accepted the offer and was sent to BRINDISI to be briefed. He denied that he had in addition an espionage mission on behalf of the British Intelligence Service, but this assertion was not believed, partly because he was sent by the latter, partly because his mission had an English name, viz, "FARWAY". In the same aircraft in which he left BRINDISI were Gen CADORNA, alias "VALENTI", and the British Army Major PETERS, later found to be the man with the fair bushy moustache, who had been observed frequenting the house at 20, Corso Porta Nuova (see sub-para i above). De LAURENTIS vigorously denied that he was connected with these two, stating that his mission consisted of himself alone, but IV/III/F's appreciation was that the three men were in fact one mission, probably "FARWAY", and that De LAURENTIS was in charge of the political side of it, while CADORNA was on the military side, controlling the partisans with PETERS as a British observer. After the landing, which took place in the Val CANNONICA, in the early morning of 20 Aug 44, De LAURENTIS went straight to MILAN, leaving CADORNA and PETERS in the mountains. In MILAN he immediately began to contact the various resistance groups, especially the Partito d'Azione, and to a lesser extent the more radical left wing parties. He presented himself to Prof PARRI, for whose more moderate views he had a great respect. When, a few days later, CADORNA arrived in MILAN, De LAURENTIS became the latter's adjutant and liaison officer with the political parties, meeting him frequently at the Arco del Pace (see para 2 c ii).

Towards the end of Oct this association gradually broke up with the arrival on the scene of PALUMBO, who began to work more and more with CADORNA in the military sphere. De LAURENTIS began to associate more with "SPADA" and SOGNO-RATA (see sub-para 1 above). "SPADA", whose real name was Lionello SANTI, arrived in N. ITALY about 25 Aug 44, together with SOGNO-RATA, head of the FRANCOCHI group. SANTI had four assistants and was engaged in sabotage work for the British Intelligence Service, and in training partisan groups in the district of BIELLA. He eventually lost interest in this mission, abandoned it and came to MILAN, where he worked for PARRI. It was at this period that De LAURENTIS and SANTI came to the notice of IV/III/F in connection with the house at 52, Viale Argonne and later at 20, Corso Porta Nuova. It was realised that, had IV/III/F decided to take prompter action at this stage, a very rich haul of Allied agents would have been made. In Nov, however, the whole organisation broke up and disappeared, presumably because they felt that they were all known to the authorities and in danger of arrest. De LAURENTIS indeed was the only one to remain and he took up residence in the Via Bandello, where he was eventually arrested. From about 20 Dec 44 - about 20 Jan 45 he was in SWITZERLAND on some unexplained business, an absence which corresponded to the period during which his trail had been lost by IV/III/F prior to his final arrest.

The interrogation of De LAURENTIS was on the whole not very satisfactory, and he certainly did not tell the whole story of his mission, nor would he, in spite of repeated persuasion, help IV/III/F to arrest CADORNA, whom at that period they wanted more than anyone else. De LAURENTIS was released on 20 Apr 45 on condition that he left the neighbourhood.

(g) THE CAFFERATTI CASE

(i) Detection and Arrest of CAFFERATTI, Elda

On 31 Dec 44, a V-mann of IV/III/F heard from a friend of his that in a house at 2, Via Petrella there lived a woman who had been heard boasting of activities of herself and friends as counter-spies. No direct action would have been taken on this flimsy hearsay evidence, had it not been for the fact that it became known that the Fascist Brigata Nera was about to arrest these persons on its own account, and as this would have made any subsequent enquiry by IV/III/F difficult, it was decided to take action at once. The house was raided and three women were arrested on the evening of 31 Dec 44. Two of the women were Elda CAFFERATTI, and Elda BONARI; the third was released on the following day as having no connection with the first two. CAFFERATTI was not directly interrogated, it being thought to be more advantageous to treat her in a most informal manner, and for a long time she was held as a "guest" in the quarters of the group of V-Leute who had arrested her, and her obvious sexual tendencies were exploited to the full. BONARI was suspected of being an informer on German V-Leute in MILAN; nothing could be proved against her, however, and she was soon released.

(ii) Interrogation of CAFFERATTI

CAFFERATTI's story was as follows: Married to an American called BRIGHT in TURIN, she had taken to the mountains with her husband in Spring 44, for a reason that was not clear. Her husband then got over the border into SWITZERLAND, and she followed him. During the journey she met a cousin of hers in LUGANO, a Swiss Lt PULT, whose mistress she very soon became (see para 2 c vii). The husband, who was in LUGANO, objected strongly to this, but with PULT's intervention was soon whisked off into an internment camp. In addition to her other duties, CAFFERATTI also became the secretary of PULT and assisted him to sort the despatches which arrived for him at regular intervals from ITALY, and she soon realised that he was, although a member of the Swiss IS, working for the Allies and in charge of the courier system over the Swiss-Italian frontier. In Jul 44 she made the acquaintance of certain friends of PULT, among whom were two Italian Lts, CAMBIAGGI and RAGAZZI, who were operating an espionage group in N. ITALY, consisting of three sections, one concentrating on military information, one on industrial espionage and the third on liaison with Liberal

and Christian Democratic circles in N. ITALY, centring round the person of Cardinal SCHUSTER of MILAN. CAFFERATTI also revealed the last known address of CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI in MILAN.

Following an affair with both CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI in turn she decided to leave SWITZERLAND and return to ITALY. In order to accomplish this she asked PULT to give her a minor espionage mission, and the latter arranged for her to be sent for this purpose to PIEDMONT. Once in N. ITALY, however, she proceeded immediately to MILAN and made no attempt to carry out her mission. After a time she fell seriously ill and while in hospital made the acquaintance of Elda BONARI, and went to live with her after her convalescence.

(iii) Attempted Penetration of the Swiss Intelligence Service

IV/III/F were satisfied with this story, and decided that CAFFERATTI had not been active as an espionage agent. When she expressed her willingness to cooperate, it was decided to try to penetrate her despatching agency in LUGANO, by sending her back to carry out certain instructions. As a test of her bona fides an attempt was made to find CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI in MILAN at the address she had given. It proved to be correct, but to have been abandoned, and their trail could not be immediately picked up. CAFFERATTI was then sent on 20 Jan 45 to SWITZERLAND, accompanied by a woman agent of IV/III/F with whom she had become very friendly. She was provided with a certain amount of genuine information to justify her journey, and she was instructed to find out the whereabouts of CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI, to obtain as much information from PULT as possible concerning his proposed future activities and as many addresses as possible of agents in MILAN. Soon afterwards the woman agent who had accompanied her, and in whom actually little trust had been placed, returned alone with a very weak story about CAFFERATTI having to remain behind for the time and with none of the required information. It was realised that CAFFERATTI had probably again come under the influence of PULT and that the penetration was likely to fail. This suspicion became a certainty when she sent a message from PULT to the most important V-Mann of IV/III/F inviting him to SWITZERLAND for a meeting with an important officer of the American Intelligence Service, who had certain advantageous proposals to make to him. When the V-Mann showed this letter to the head of IV/III/F, it was decided to break off the attempted penetration.

(iv) Detection and Arrest of CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI

Meanwhile the search for CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI continued and their trail was found in the following way: A certain Dr. BENASSI was wanted for his connection with Mission TAR, and from a letter found on one of the less important men arrested at the same time as PALUBO on 8 Feb 45, it was found out that BENASSI often frequented a house at 19, Via Massona. He was in fact arrested at this house a week later, and, proving unimportant, was released in Mar; on the other hand it was learned that there lived in the same house two young men, of whom one was called RAGAZZI. They proved indeed to be none other than the two agents mentioned by CAFFERATTI, and were arrested on 19 Feb 45. A large number of WT codes and briefs were found, and one of the prisoners was heard to whisper to a servant: "Careful about the Via Alleanza!" V-Loute were accordingly sent to find what might be hidden here, and found an apartment rented under the names of CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI at No 4, which contained two hidden transmitters.

(v) Interrogation of CAMBLAGGI and RAGAZZI

Interrogation of the pair, coupled with evaluation of the various documents found on their arrest, elicited some interesting facts, but the interrogation was by no means easy, as they proved very stubborn and lied in every possible respect. These difficulties were somewhat neutralised by the information already obtained from Elda CAFFERATTI.

The two were both Army officers and had fled to SWITZERLAND after the Italian surrender in 43, where they spent the winter in an internment camp.

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In order to return to ITALY, they had severally made representations to the Italian Legation and each had been told that return to ITALY would be easier if they accepted a minor espionage mission. RAGAZZI was to study and report on industrial conditions and German and Fascist propaganda in MILAN, whilst CAMBIAGGI had a similar task in GENOA, including also conditions in the port. They came to ITALY together in the beginning of May 44 and began working under the names "PIERO I" and "PIERO II". They denied strenuously that they had any military tasks or that they had furnished copious and well-received reports to SWITZERLAND via Lt PULT, which contradicted CAFFERATTI's statements. They both remained stubbornly silent about the organisation they worked for, insisting that they had only had connections with the Italian Legation. They admitted that they had crossed the border under the auspices of Lt PULT and that they were in SWITZERLAND in Jul 44 for the purpose of delivering their only report, which, they said, did not excite much enthusiasm on the part of PULT. The fact that they were not telling the whole truth about their mission was borne out by the presence of the two WT sets which were found at No 4, Via Alleanze, although there was every evidence that they had not been used for some time. The whole question of their role was never satisfactorily cleared up.

RAGAZZI was exchanged on 15 Apr 45, and CAMBIAGGI was released unconditionally on 23 Apr 45.

(h) THE CASE OF PEPE AND LENER

(i) Detection and Arrest of PEPE

Among the documents found on PALUMBO (of Mission ORO) was a report containing the following paragraph: ".....PEPE, who has produced such good reports in the past, seems now to have stopped work. It appears that he thinks he is earning enough money from his Legion, and can now rest on his laurels. A stern reminder seems indicated, either on Radio SARDINIA or in the Bolletini di Controspionaggio, to remind him of his duty.....". On the strength of this document, IV/III/F request AK MILAN to have PEPE arrested by the end of Mar 45. He was in the MUTI Legion (cf CSDIC/CMF/SD 13 para 2 c vi c, where PEPE is said to have given information to SS Hauptsturmfuehrer SAEVECKE, Fuehrer of AK MILAN. He was lodged in the SAN VITTORE gaol, Abt V, remaining there at IV/III/F's disposal until the capitulation; he was not released, even when he ceased to be of interest, as he was held to be a double-dyed rogue as well as being politically dangerous. He had become extremely unpopular in MILAN through his activity with the MUTI Legion, a body which was hated by the local population.

(ii) Interrogation of PEPE

The interrogation of PEPE was carried out by HAUTH, and produced the following results: After long service with the Police he had been officially transferred to the MUTI Legion, then in the process of formation, with the idea of camouflaging the activities of the Legion under a cloak of Police authority. The Legion had, both before and afterwards, been carrying out a series of exploits which in the popular opinion were more plain brigandage rather than aids to the furtherance of political ideas. Accordingly PEPE, with a high position in this organisation, excited extraordinary hatred among the anti-Fascist elements of the population. He knew that he had but slim prospects of survival if the Germans evacuated MILAN, and accordingly began to think out ways of ensuring his safety in case of such an eventuality.

(iii) Contact with LENER

In the early part of summer of 44, he came into contact with his old schoolfriend, the lawyer Michele LENER, who, although a Fascist up to 1924, had drifted into the other camp after the MATTEOTTI affair. LENER had taken part in a number of political trials as defending counsel and had lately taken a more active part in the activities of the anti-Fascist movement, even to the

extent of being arrested by the AK MILAN, from whose clutches he was only released by the intervention of Dr. "UGO", with whom he had some influence. To LENER, PEPE poured out his life story, and the former realised that he could be of some use to him, suggesting that information on the formation and activities of the MUTI Legion would be of service to both of them. PEPE agreed to this and furnished in the course of the next few weeks a series of reports dealing with the chief protagonists of the Legion and also its nefarious exploits. This was particularly interesting in the light of the subsequent revelation that LENER was a representative of the American IS in MILAN.

(iv) Arrest and Release of LENER

On the strength of PEPE's evidence, LENER was arrested at the beginning of Apr and interrogated by ILUTH and BURI, but he denied almost everything that PEPE alleged, and was released in mid Apr. Yet the matter was not regarded as cleared up, principally because certain individuals from AK MILAN seemed surprisingly anxious to have LENER set free, and their relations with him had to be watched subsequently. In view of the interest shown in LENER by these persons, a vague suspicion arose that there was some collaboration between such people as Dr. "UGO" and Lino MORGANTI of AK MILAN on the one side and the Central Committee on the other; it was discovered that Dr. "UGO" was closely connected with LENER, and was, if not wittingly, at least unconsciously being used by the latter for the benefit of the enemy IS. The final proofs of such a dangerous intrigue were never obtained as the course of the war soon put a stop to all activities.

3. USE OF DF INTERCEPT SERVICE

DF and Intercept cover of enemy WT stations in LOMBARDY, PIEDMONT and LIGURIA was provided by a short-range DF Pl under Lt ZEMKE, which was part of the Aussenstelle ITALIEN in VERONA of OKW/WNV/Fu III. The ZEMKE Pl is confirmed in OSDIO/CMF/SD 13 para 2.C.III.a, and OSDIO/CMF/SD 18 para 2.A.III.b. This cover produced no positive results as far as IV/III/F was concerned, as no illicit WT sets were discovered by this means in connection with any of the cases handled by them, and in only one case did they enlist ZEMKE's assistance in attempting to pin-point a suspected transmitter - incidentally without success.

The ZEMKE Pl operated for all German CE agencies in the area. As far as IV/III/F was concerned, it had the additional function of operating play-backs of agents handled by that department - permission would have to be obtained first from IV/III/F VERONA. In practice this function was never exercised. In the first place Sources were of the opinion, from the experience gained in ROME, that play-backs were rarely worth the effort expended, and in the second place almost all the WT sets captured were found damaged or incapable of functioning.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS

When a case was completed, a copy of the final report was sent to IV/III/F VERONA (Rittmeister LANG) and normally to SS Standartenfuhrer RAUFF, Head of Sipo und SD Gruppe OBERITALIEN WEST. In certain cases copies were sent to the Sipo und SD Aussenkommando or Militaerkommandatur of towns in which captured agents had been operating. Certain reports for instance had been sent to Aussenkommandos GENOA and TURIN and to the Militaerkommandaturen of BERGAMO and COMO.

The originals of the reports were kept by IV/III/F MILAN and all names entered in the card-index. Eleven documents were burnt on 25 Apr 45 before the office was evacuated.

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5. SUMMARY OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES KNOWN TO IV/III/F

(a) British Intelligence Agencies

(i) BRINDISI

It was known that a British Intelligence school existed in BRINDISI and that agents on British missions were despatched from there, but no details of its personnel or organisation were discovered.

(ii) BERNE

The head of the British Intelligence Service in BERNE was a Professor ROSSI, originally from the University of PISA. He controlled various sub-departments in SWITZERLAND, one being at LUGANO under a man named GASPERINI. ROSSI's courier between his HQ and the various outstations was a certain "JOHNNY".

A Major "JONES" was known to be operating in BERNE too, but his exact affiliations were never discovered. It was known that DE ANGELIS (see para 2 f) had been in contact with him.

(b) American Intelligence Agencies

BERNE

The reputed head of this agency was a certain ARTURO. He controlled an outstation in LUGANO through another man named "JONES" who was also known as "SCOTTI" (see para 2.c.iv). "JONES" had various assistants, among whom was Carlo PELLEGRINI (see para 2.c.v.).

(c) Italian Intelligence Agencies

(i) BRINDISI or MONOPOLI

The Italian organisation SIM worked from one of the above mentioned towns, and maintained two underground centres in EOT. One was in BERGAMO under the command of a Lt-Col LEONARDI; the other was in COMO under another Lt-Col whose name was not known. The main achievement of SIM was to penetrate and largely neutralize the Fascist organisation in MILAN, SID. Their chief agent in this task was a certain Major AGIETORA.

(ii) BERNE

General BLANCHI, Military Attache to the Italian Legation in BERNE, was also head of the Italian Intelligence Service, his deputy and right hand man for intelligence matters being a Major DENARI. Working under Major DENARI was a Lt PISCICELLI of the 3rd SAVOIA Regt, who in summer 44 tried to set up a large scale information network in NORTH ITALY. This task was later taken over by PALUMBO (see account of Mission ORO para 2.c.vi). On DENARI's staff was a Major INAUDI whose main task was propaganda and welfare work in internment camps for Italian officers in SWITZERLAND. FERRARI, Naval Attache to the Italian Legation, cooperated with DENARI, but also sent out agents on his own account, as did a certain Principe "Di COLA" whose function was not accurately determined.

(iii) LUGANO

A second Intelligence organisation was that set up by the Comitato Italiano in LUGANO. The military adviser to the Comitato was a certain FEDERICI, who liaised closely with the Intelligence department of the Italian Legation in BERNE. Subordinate to FEDERICI was BUSTELLI, alias "JOE" who was in charge of distributing information collected by the organisation's agents to British and American Intelligence centres (see para 2.c.vii).

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(d) Swiss Intelligence Service

(1) LUGANO

Lt PULT, employer of CAFFERATI (para 2 g) was head of a Swiss Intelligence Agency in LUGANO. He was instrumental in helping Allied agents to cross the Swiss-Italian frontier, and in return was entitled to know the contents of their reports.

Another member of the Swiss Intelligence Service was a certain HOF, later replaced by a man named REBUSTELLI. It was not known whether they worked with or for PULT, but in any case they maintained close contact with him. HOF established an efficient group of informers in the COMO-VARESE area and was in contact with the CLNAI in MILAN through an Italian factory owner whose identity was not discovered.

(e) General

On the whole Sources were of the opinion that the Allied Intelligence Services were superior to the G.I.S. due to better training and larger material resources, both in men and money.

They differentiated little between the agents sent by British, American or Italian agencies. The former generally recruited the best type of agents, except in the case of their WT operators, who were uniformly bad. These agents generally stood up well to interrogation but would have been better still if more respect had been shown them by the British briefing officers and instructors. During interrogation they all expressed the opinion that the British officers looked on them as inferior types; this was a point the German interrogators were able to utilize to the full. Financial help to agents after they were in EOT was not enough to keep up their morale, and moreover the WT sets were of inferior make, largely unfamiliar to the Italian operators, constantly breaking down and impossible to repair locally, due to the lack of suitable spare parts.

Sources had no particular comments to make on the agents sent by the American and Italian Intelligence Services. They had the impression that the latter service was completely under the control of the Allied Command.

6. PERSONALITIES

A. Allied Agents and assistants

ARGANTE

Italian officer, member of Mission ORO.
No description.
(SWITZERLAND - Autumn 44)

ARGENTI, Gustavo

Italian civilian, member of Mission O-11
Age about 24, from MILAN.
About 1.77m tall, well-built, black hair,
broad face, black moustache, healthy
complexion.
(MILAN - mid Apr 45)

BARBATO, Mario

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission ORO.
Age about 40, from MILAN.
About 1.75m tall, powerful build, dark brown
hair, big head, strongly marked features.
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

BEOLCHINI, Aldo
alias BIANCHI

Italian officer, Colonel. Assistant to
Col PALUMBO of Mission ORO.
Age about 35, from NOVARA.
About 1.75m tall, slim build, black hair, pale
complexion, thick lips.
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

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BERTO (possibly alias,
real name believed to be
CAMPANA)

Italian officer, head of Mission TAR.
Age about 33.
About 1.70m tall, athletic build, dark hair,
broad face.

(MILAN - mid Apr 45)

BORIN, Arrigo

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission Oll
Age about 28.
About 1.65m tall, powerful build, fair hair,
round face, healthy complexion.

(MILAN - 31 Mar 45)

BOVIENZE, Raffaele

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission ORO.
Age about 32, doctor from BUSTO ARSIZIO.
About 1.75m tall, well built, fair hair,
square head, wears spectacles, healthy
complexion, walks with feet turned inwards.

(MILAN - 22 Apr 45)

BRUNI, Pio

Italian officer, assistant of Col PALUMBO.
Age about 30.
About 1.70m tall, slim build, dark brown
hair, handsome features, pale complexion.

(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

CAFFERATTI, Elda

Italian civilian, worked for Swiss Intelligence
Service.

Age about 20.
About 1.70m tall, slim figure, long fair hair,
pretty, blue eyes, pale complexion, unhealthy
appearance.

(LUGANO - end Jan 45)

CAMBIAGGI, Luigi

Italian officer, working for Italian
Intelligence Service.

Age about 27, engineering student from BIELLA.
About 1.70m tall, well built, wavy chestnut
hair, round head, nervous manner.

(MILAN - 23 Apr 45)

CRIVELLI, Marchese

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission ORO.
Age about 35, from MILAN.
About 1.75m tall, well built, short black
hair, 'egg-shaped' head, pale complexion.

(MILAN - 30 Jan 45)

D'ANGELO

Italian civilian, WT operator of Mission ORO.
No description (arrested by AK MILAN).

DE ANGELIS

Italian officer, member of Mission TAR.
Age about 27, from MILAN.
About 1.73m tall, slim build, slight stoop,
fair hair, thin face, beaky nose, pale
complexion.

(MILAN - mid Apr 45)

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DE LAURENTIS, Augusto
alias PINCHIERA or
MAZZEI or FEREO

Italian civilian, member of Mission "FARWAY".
Age about 25, from ROME.
About 1.75m tall, thin build, slight stoop,
fair hair, round head, regular features,
healthy complexion, blue eyes, wears
spectacles.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

FOGOLIN, Anna

Italian civilian.
Age about 30, from MILAN.
About 1.75m tall, slim figure, long-legged,
short light brown hair, oval face, wears
spectacles.

(MILAN - End Apr 45)

GAMBA, Aldo
alias NERI, Amadeo

Italian officer, working for British Intelli-
gence Service.
Age about 30, from BRESCIA.
About 1.70m tall, slim build, dark hair,
thin face, straight nose.

(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

GERBI, Antonio

Italian civilian, WT operator for Mission
TAR.

Age about 25.
About 1.78m tall, thin build, upright bearing,
black hair, long head, thin face, pale
complexion.

(MILAN - mid Apr 45)

GREPPI, Carlo

Italian officer, assistant of Col PALUMBO.
Age about 32.

About 1.70m tall, thin build, hollow-chested,
light brown hair, 'mouse-like face' pale
complexion, very garrulous.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

ITALI, Roberto

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission O 11.
Age about 19, from MILAN.

About 1.75m tall, slim build, dark brown bushy
hair, oval face, very handsome.

(MILAN - beg Apr 45)

LENER, Michele

Italian civilian, representative in MILAN
of American Intelligence Service.
Age about 40, lawyer from MILAN, Corso
Littorio.

About 1.67m tall, slim build, thin light
brown hair, small head, lively manner.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45).

MARZORATTI, Guiseppe

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission O 11.
Age about 30, from MILAN.

About 1.82m tall, well built, black hair,
big head.

(MILAN - mid Apr 45)

PALUMBO, Vittorio
Alias : PAGE

Italian officer, Col in charge of Mission ORO.
Age about 36.

About 1.70m tall, powerful build, wavy light
brown hair, oval face, beaky nose, healthy
complexion, swinging gait.

(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

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PEDUZZI, alias FELTRE

Italian civilian, working for the American Intelligence Service.
Age about 30, doctor from MILAN.
About 1.73m tall, thin figure, upright bearing, sloping shoulders, short fair hair, thin face, pale complexion, wears spectacles
(MILAN - end Apr 45)

PEPE

Italian police official, member of the MUTI Legion.
Age about 38.
About 1.75m tall, stout, broad shouldered, thin black hair, very big head, ugly pock-marked face, impediment in speech.
(MILAN - end Apr 45)

PETERS

British officer, liaison officer with partisans.
Age about 35.
About 1.75m tall, well built, light brown hair, long fair moustache.
(MILAN - Oct 44)

RAGAZZI, Bruno

Italian officer, working for Italian Intelligence Service.
Age about 27, from MILAN.
About 1.75m tall, slim build, fair hair, pale complexion, handsome features, blue eyes.
(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

RAINACH-SEGRE

Italian, working for the American Intelligence Service.
No description.
(Not seen by Sources)

ROSSI, Aleno

Italian civilian, courier for Missions O 11 and O 21.
Age about 28.
About 1.73m tall, medium build, brown hair, small thin face, very pale complexion, (suffers from tuberculosis).
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

ROTTA, Luigi

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission ORO.
Age about 28, from MILAN.
About 1.65m tall, slim build, reddish fair hair, narrow head, sharp features, fair moustache, walked with toes turned out.
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

SACCHI, Giovanni

Italian civilian, worked for various Missions.
Age about 32, from MILAN.
About 1.68m tall, athletic build, light brown hair, broad face, prominent chin, sallow complexion, very long arms.
(MILAN - end Apr 45)

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SAGGESE, Saggio

Italian civilian, assisted Mission TAR.
Age about 30, from MILAN.
About 1.72m tall, thin weak build, pronounced stoop, bushy black hair grey at temples, small head, pale unhealthy complexion, black eyes.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

SANTI, Lionello
alias SPADA, Lionello

Italian civilian, working for British Intelligence Service.
Age about 30, oculist.
About 1.80m tall, medium build, oval face, wears spectacles.

(MILAN - Oct 44)

SEARS, Agricola

Italian civilian, assistant of Mission O 11.
No description.

(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

SILANI, Claudio

Italian civilian, assistant of Col PALUMBO
Age about 32.

About 1.68m tall, thin build, dark hair, thin face, calm assured manner.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

SILVIERI, Ernesto
alias Galloano

Italian civilian, member of Mission O 11.
Age about 30.

About 1.70m tall, slim build, dark brown hair, "egg-shaped head", pale face, 'shifty' expression, prominent ears.

(MILAN - 13 Feb 45)

SOGNO-RATA

Italian, head of FRANCHI group.
No description.

(Not seen by sources).

USMLANI alias
"Claudio"

Italian officer, Major. Member of Mission U16.

Age about 35.

About 1.75m tall, slim figure, upright bearing, black hair, long head, thin face, aquiline nose, small mouth, healthy complexion.

(MILAN - end Feb 45)

ZACHHIA, Edmondo

Italian officer, assistant of Mission O 11.
Age about 30.

About 1.68m tall, well built, brown hair, big head, ruddy complexion.

(MILAN - mid Feb 45)

and all the following
(b) Italian Agents and Informers of IV/III/F MILAN

In the light of further interrogation Sources, based on information received from an independent source, they have amended and expanded the information given under this heading in CSDIC/CMF/SD 9. The following personalities therefore should be taken as superseding the list of personalities given under this heading in CSDIC/CMF/SD 9, and although they are largely the same, they have been repeated in full for the sake of clarity and continuity.

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CSDIC/CMF/SD 50

X ANGELIS, Francisco Dr,
Alias : Franz

Age about 30.

About 1.75m tall, broad shoulders, black hair, moustache, pale face, walks with a stoop.

Speaks Greek.

Address: MILAN, near Exhibition buildings.

(MILAN - 23 Apr 45)

X ARISTA, Aldo
Alias : (Dr) MULLER

Age about 30, single.

About 1.75m tall, powerful build, thin fair hair, square face, Roman dialect.

Address : MILAN, Albergo Plinius.

(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

X BELLAVISTA, Carlo
Alias : PERNA, Carlo, or
Carlo .

Age about 33.

About 1.75m tall, slim figure, black hair, pale face, intelligent appearance.

Address : MILAN, near Corso Roma.

(MILAN - 1 Apr 45)

X BICCHIERA, Aldo

Age about 40.

About 1.70m tall, strong, fattish build, sparse hair, pale square face.

Address : COMO.

(MILAN - about 15 Apr 45)

X BORELLA, Giovanni
alias : Sergio

Age about 28, married.

About 1.70m tall, broad shoulders, brown hair going bald, fresh complexion, brown eyes, moustache. Said to be a German.

Address : MILAN, Via Castel Morone, 14.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

X BOZZI, Giorgia

Age about 25, single.

About 1.65m tall, medium build, light brown hair, small pale face.

Address : MILAN.

(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

X BRAMANTI, *from*
Alias : *ABDALCAN* *from*

Age about 33.

About 1.80m tall, slim build, dark brown hair, oval face, moustache, well dressed.

Address : COMO.

(MILAN - about 15 Apr 45)

X CENTOLA, Luigi

Age about 22, single.

About 1.70m tall, medium build, brown hair.

Address : TURIN.

(MILAN - end Mar 45)

X COSLOVICH, Solange (female)

Age about 23, single.

About 1.65m tall, hair varied according to taste, pale face.

Speaks Italian with foreign accent.

Address : MILAN, Albergo Plinius.

(MILAN - 1 Apr 45)

X DANZI, Delia
Alias Anna Maria X

Mistress of BURI.

Age about 37.

About 1.70m tall, good looking, dark hair, very intelligent, speaks with Neapolitan accent.

(MILAN - 23 Apr 45)

X DUBAUX, Maria-Theresa

Friend of SANDRA (q.v.)
Born in FRANCE.
Age about 26.
About 1.70m tall, slim figure, fair hair,
blue eyes, pale complexion, pretty.
(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

X FANNINGER, Bruno

Age about 35, married.
About 1.70m tall, powerful build, light brown
hair, moustache, Slavonic type.
Address : MILAN, Hotel Diana.
(MILAN - end Mar 45)

X FOSSATI, Cesare

Age about 45, married.
About 1.70m tall, powerful build, thin fair
hair, pale face.
Address : MILAN, Via Argonne, 52.
(MILAN - 22 Apr 45)

X FRIGENTI, Giovanni

Age about 35, single.
About 1.70m tall, medium build, black hair,
dark complexion.
Address : MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

Gildo (l.n.u.)

Age about 30.
About 1.65m tall, unclean appearance, black
hair, ashen complexion.
Speaks Bergamo dialect.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - Beginning Apr 45)

X GUADAGNINO, Jupp,
Alias : Jeppi

Age about 28, married.
About 1.65m tall, powerful figure, light
brown hair, pale face, moustache.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 10 Apr 45)

Izzo (l.n.u.)

Age about 30.
About 1.75m tall, corpulent build, thick fair
hair, moustache, pale face.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

X "LA MEDICA, Raffaele" (Alias)

About 40.
About 1.70m tall, medium build, brown hair
going bald, oldish face.
(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

X MALMO, Giovanni

Age about 30, married.
About 1.70m tall, dark brown hair, pale
square face, wears glasses, untidily dressed.
Speaks with Roman dialect.
Address : MILAN, Piazza Cecilia, 5.
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

X MALMO, Carla

Wife of above, and acted his secretary.
Age about 22, married.
About 1.60m tall, full figure, fair hair,
pale face, hook nose.
Speaks with Roman dialect.
Address : MILAN, Piazza Cecilia, 5.
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

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X MROZZI, Carlo
Alias : Leoni

Age about 35, single.
About 1.80m tall, slim build, black hair,
sharp features.
Address : MILAN, Via Petrella.
(MILAN - about 25 Apr 45)

X NERENDA, Antonio

Age about 28, single.
About 1.70m tall, slim build, black hair,
round face,
Address : MILAN, Via Petrella.
(MILAN - 25 Apr 45)

X NELLO, Miche

Age about 30, single.
About 1.85m tall, slim build, dark hair,
longish face, moustache.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

X NERI, Uberto Major

Age about 45.
About 1.70m tall, red cheeks, hook nose,
short neck.
Address : MILAN, Hotel Plaza.
(MILAN - beg Mar 45)

Nino (l.n.u.)

Age about 30.
About 1.75m tall, medium build, black hair,
energetic square face, smartly dressed.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 23 Apr 45)

X PALUMBO, Mario

Age about 35.
About 1.65m tall, slim build, black hair,
small dark moustache.
Worked for Italian SID.
(MILAN - Apr 45)

X PAMPOLINI, Giuseppe
Alias : Pippo

Age about 30.
About 1.65m tall, dark hair, slim build,
small head, hook nose, protruding ears.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 10 Apr 45)

X PETTER, (Dr)

Age about 50, single.
About 1.75m tall, corpulent, thin hair,
red scarred face.
Address : Near STREMA.
(MILAN - end Mar 45)

X YRAULI

Age about 45.
About 1.73m tall, powerful build, grizzled
hair, healthy tan.
(MILAN - Apr 45)

Renato (l.n.u.)

Age about 40.
About 1.60m tall, black hair, hook nose.
Speaks with Venotian dialect.
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 15 Mar 45)

(4)

"Rigoletto" (alias)

Age about 40, married.
About 1.80m tall, slim build, fair hair
going grey, badly dressed.
Address : MILAN, Quartiere Magenta.
(MILAN - beg Mar 45)

✓ ROSSI, Fausto,
Alias : MISIPI, Pasquale,
or vice versa.

Arrested.
See SCI (4) report, JRX-433)

Q PASQUALE, Pasquale
✓ SACCA, Alberto,
Alias : DR ELWENS

In charge of group in TURIN.
Age about 37, married.
About 1.75m tall, slim build, smartly
dressed, speaks fluent German.
Address : TURIN.
(MILAN - end Mar 45)

✓ SANDRA, from
Alias : Sanna

Suffered at hands of partisans and acted
as informer against them in revenge.
Age about 38, but looks younger.
About 1.70m tall, pretty, hair, various
tints but last seen chestnut, fresh complexion.
(MILAN - 1 Apr 45)

Silvio (l.n.u.)

Age about 35.
About 1.65m tall, black hair, hard features,
olive complexion, Southern dialect.
Address : COMO.
(MILAN - 15 Mar 45)

✓ RACI, (Dr) Lillo

Age about 35.
About 1.70m tall, powerful build, handsome
face, smart appearance.
Address : GENOA.
(MILAN - 1 Apr 45)

Tino (l.n.u.)

Age about 27, single.
About 1.65m tall, medium build, dark hair,
Address : MILAN.
(MILAN - 15 Apr 45)

✓ WALTHER, (Dr) Basso

Friend of SACCA.
May well have been a double agent, and was
arrested as such in mid 44 in VERONA but
finally acquitted.
Age about 35.
About 1.75m tall, slim build, black hair
brushed back, pale face, mouth habitually
open.
(MILAN - beg Apr 45)

✓ ZUNI, Lillo or Lello

Age about 35.
About 1.70m tall, broad shoulders, square
head, black hair, pale face, wears glasses.
Address : MILAN, Via Castel Morino, 14.
(MILAN - 20 Apr 45)

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